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I would like to thank the Chairman of the subcommittee, Congressman Roe, ranking 
member, Congressman Tierney, and the other members of the subcommittee for this 
opportunity. My testimony will focus on the economic realities and legal issues relating to 
joint employer status in workplaces where extensive subcontracting of core business 
functions depends on temporary staffing services and franchising relationships.  
An examination of these two forms of business organization is critical for 
understanding why the National Labor Relations Board is looking to its traditional joint 
employer test as one means of making fundamental labor rights available to workers 
experiencing the precarious consequences of the profound transformations now occurring 
in the modern workplace.  By re-examining its joint employer test, the Board is fulfilling the 
responsibility that the U.S. Supreme Court has held is entrusted to it, i.e., to “adapt the Act 
to changing patterns of industrial life.”1 In my lifetime, no change in the patterns of 
industrial life has been more upending than the rapid expansion of precarious low-wage 
work and subcontracting that has irreversibly fissured the 21st century workplace.   
Temporary staffing and franchising account for a disproportionate share of the 
economic growth following the Great Recession of 2008. By 2013, staffing services 
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generated $109 billion in sales and 2.8 million temp positions – a full 2.0 percent of total 
jobs. Profits are also high; In the first quarter of this year, True Blue (formerly Labor 
Ready), the largest U.S. staffing agency, had a profit of $120 million on gross revenues of 
$453 million.  Franchising is equally profitable as evidenced by the fast-food sector of the 
restaurant industry where in 2012 the ten largest franchises employed over 2.25 million 
workers, earned more than $7.4 billion in profits and distributed another $7.7 billion in 
buybacks and dividends to shareholders.  
Unfortunately, the economic impacts of temporary staffing and franchising are 
Janus-faced.  Soaring profits and substantial job growth in these sectors has advanced hand 
in glove with poverty-level wages and extraordinarily high rates of wage theft and health 
and safety violations.   
Compared to direct hires, temp workers experience a wage penalty, which is most 
severe for blue-collar temps who now comprise 42 per cent of the temporary staffing 
workforce. For example, in metro Chicago, temp workers that load and unload goods for 
WalMart and other big box stores comprise over two-thirds of the 150,000 workers in the 
warehouse workforce.  They average $9 per hour or $3.48 less than direct hires. Almost 
two-thirds of these workers fall below the federal poverty line.  A well documented, 
national epidemic of wage theft by unscrupulous staffing agencies and their clients only 
makes matters worse for temps. Further, OSHA complaints and protests by temp workers 
have unearthed major health and safety issues, causing OSHA to establish a Temporary 
Worker Initiative to determine, in part, when to hold staffing agencies and client employers 
jointly liable for violations impacting the temporary workforce.  
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There are more than 3.5 million fast-food workers and more than 75 per cent of 
them work in franchised outlets.  Numerous studies indicate that under-employment, 
poverty-inducing earnings and wage theft are the norms. Households that include an 
employed, fast-food worker are four times as likely to live below the federal poverty level. 
The social costs of these conditions are born by U.S. taxpayers who shell out about $3.8 
billion per year to cover the cost of public benefits received by fast-food workers employed 
at the top-ten fast-food franchises who are compelled to rely on government welfare 
programs to supplement poverty level wages.  
These workplace ills, pervasive in temping and franchising arrangements, are 
unquestionably subject to correction through the issuance of unfair labor practice charges 
and collective bargaining. Accordingly, the NLRB is now rightfully re-examining its test for 
joint employer status in Browning-Ferris Industries,2 a representation case involving temp 
workers employed at a large California recycling facility where the sorting work is 
performed entirely by a temporary staffing workforce.  
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the NLRB’s joint employment test is designed 
to determine whether a putative joint employer “possesses sufficient control over the work 
of the employees to qualify as a ‘joint employer’ with [the actual employer].”3 Joint 
employment occurs when “one employer, while contracting in good faith with an otherwise 
independent company, has retained for itself sufficient control of the terms and conditions 
of employment of the employees who are employed by the other employer.”4  Absolute 
control over the employees of another employer is not required. Rather, the test 
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4 NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3rd Cir. 1982) 
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“recognizes that the business entities involved are in fact separate but that they share or 
co-determine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment.”5 
 In temporary staffing arrangements, the user employer controls the day-to-day 
work environment of the temporary workforce. This reality flows from the fact that temp 
agencies are “labor-only” contractors that neither own nor lease capital equipment utilized 
by temporary employees, which is under the sole control of the user employer.  
Accordingly, contracts governing temping arrangements typically conform to this reality, 
ceding to the client employer’s management and supervisory employees  a major role in co-
determining the terms and conditions of work.  
The standard staffing contract assigns to the staffing agency only control over wage 
payments, withholding of payroll taxes, provision of workers’ compensation and ensuring 
civil rights compliance.  User clients, on the other hand, are contractually assigned all other 
employer responsibilities traditionally associated with the production of goods and 
services: supervision and direction of day-to-day work; control of working conditions at 
the work site; responsibility for ensuring a safe work site including civil rights compliance, 
provide tools and equipment and determining the length of the temp workers’ 
assignments.6 
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 Tightly controlled business format franchisee arrangements have expanded 
significantly in the last decade to ensure that major franchisors like Burger King and other 
fast-food corporations can maintain uniformity of brand, product and operations that are 
essential to its business model.  Under these agreements, control over franchisee workers’ 
terms and conditions of employment are exercised through training, operating manuals, and 
communications with franchisees established in these business format agreements.7  
Sophisticated management systems are in place to ensure that the franchisor brand 
is maintained and protected, creating a high-level of franchisor control over fast-food 
workers terms and conditions of employment. Through these systems, including 
unannounced, on-site visits by franchisor representatives, the franchisor can dictate the 
number of workers required to do the job, the manner and speed of the performance of 
every work task, the equipment and supplies used on the job, the manner in which 
equipment is used as well as employee grooming and uniform standards.  Every one of 
these contract provisions dictated by the franchisor directly impacts terms and conditions 
of employment that are core of collective bargaining issues that can be addressed by the 
franchisee workforce’s protected concerted activity.  
Given these economic realities, the NLRB is well within the authority granted to it by 
Congress to adapt its traditional joint employer test to determine whether client employers 
of a temporary staffing agency and/or a major franchisor like Taco Bell are joint employers.  
Nothing in the statutory text of the NLRA or in well-reasoned precedent prevents the Board 
from returning to the traditional joint employer test that was the norm until 1980 when a 
rigid and narrower conception of joint-employment gained sway in Board proceedings.  
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The traditional, well-reasoned view of joint employment, also found in the majority opinion 
M.B. Sturgis/JeffBoat 8 and in the dissent in Oakwood Care,9 permits the Board to craft the 
appropriate unit for collective bargaining purposes, including “the employer unit, craft unit, 
plant unit, or other unit.”10  Similarly, the Act’s definition of employer gives the Board wide 
latitude in determining whether a staffing agency’s user client exercises the necessary 
indicia of control for joint employer status.  
Notably, the current joint-employer test has virtually prevented any group of temp 
agency or fast-food franchise workers from achieving a voice in their workplaces.  Given 
this, the NLRB’s reassessment of joint-employer status is in no way extraordinary.  Rather, 
it is consistent with Supreme Court precedent on the role of the agency to adapt federal 
labor law to changing conditions and entirely consistent with the powers vested in the 
agency by this Congress. Moreover, the Board’s decision to take a hard look at its joint 
employer standard is both reasonable and practical as a means of considering how millions 
of low-wage workers can meaningfully exercise their fundamental right to collective 
bargain with their employers.  
It is my view that a return to the Board’s traditional, better-reasoned explication of 
the joint-employer standard is necessary to achieve both the flexibility employers seek and 
the fair treatment and decent wages workers are now demanding. A failure to do so runs 
the risk of rendering labor law irrelevant in the much of the low-wage economy, 
obstructing the efficacy of collective bargaining, and increasing the potential for strikes and 
other forms of industrial strife or unrest.  It takes little imagination to foresee the potential 
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for industrial strife when large concentrations of under-employed, low-wage temporary 
workers and franchised fast-food workers are unable to meaningfully exercise their 
fundamental rights to bargain over the terms and conditions of employment that are jointly 
established by both of their employers.   
Thank you for considering my comments.  
